

From the Primacy of Partisan Politics to the Post-Fordist  
Tendency in Yugoslav Self-Management Socialism<sup>1</sup>  
by Gal Kirn

1 The text was inspired by Boris Buden's discussion in RESET seminar organised in Mostar (February 2008). Special thanks go to Angela Facundo and Lev Centrih for their valuable comments.

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## 1. Introduction: Post-Yugoslav Ideological-Theoretical Conuncture

Socialist Yugoslavia is not a very hot topic nowadays, but if it does hit the headlines, various experts and dissidents present it by way of personal memoirs or as 'totalitarian studies'.<sup>2</sup> Yugoslavia is presented as a political failure, a 'prison-house of nations' with an inefficient economical system, which endured due to the strong hand of dictator Tito. The 'gloomy totalitarian past' account finds its double in a popular perspective present in everyday post-Yugoslav life, viz. Yugonostalgia or Titostalgia, which glorifies the 'good old times' and commodifies the socialist symbolic and Tito.<sup>3</sup> Apart from this ideological constellation two fundamental interpretations can be distinguished about the 'specificity' of this historical period. The first reading reduces the existing socialisms to state capitalism,<sup>4</sup> in which the Communist Party plays a key role in directing the whole of society. This position argues for the following formula: *totalitarian rule (Party-politics) and state capitalism (planned economy) are inextricably bound*. In contrast to this view, official ideologues and socialist theoreticians of that time would speak of the specificity of socialist society, proclaiming the end of class struggle<sup>5</sup> and the inevitable arrival

- 2 For a critical reading of influential historical studies (e.g. Ivo Banac and Mirjana Kasapović) see Buden (2003), Jovanović & Arsenijević (2007), Centrih (2008). The key thesis of these critiques shows how the dominant historiographies legitimise new ethnic divisions in the post-Yugoslav context, where the central point of demonisation is communism, which was lacking political pluralism, legal framework and economic stability. For a critique of totalitarian studies, see Žižek (2001b).
- 3 See Mitja Velikonja (2009).
- 4 In the West, a critique of real-socialism from a socialist perspective appeared already in the 1950s, in France with the group *Socialisme ou barbarie*, or in the US with James et al. (1958). For a more detailed view of critical debates internal to Marxism's critique of real socialisms see Katja Diefenbach's article in this book.
- 5 The political practice of socialists from Stalin's constitution of 1936 onwards calls for the abandonment of the concept of the class struggle. Class struggle completely lost its political weight. In real socialisms it became →

of the communist *Heaven on Earth*. The first argument operated with the identification of capitalism and socialism, the second one identified socialism with communism. Both narratives share a blind spot that prevents them from really thinking 'socialist' social formations. It reduces their complexity and neutralises the class character of socialist social relations. The future, the result of their theoretical model, is known in advance. This ideological gesture eliminates the transformative character of politics that touches the Real, the 'not-yet-existing' dimension.

In opposition to this binary ideological-theoretical constellation we would like to shed new light on the complexity of socialist societies.<sup>6</sup> We would like to put forward a condensed thesis, sketched by Althusser: *socialism = capitalism + communism*.<sup>7</sup> Inspired by this, we will analyse Yugoslav socialism in two ways: in the first part we will briefly address the issue of political rupture that the new Yugoslavia generated and how it transformed social relations, its *communist politics*, while in the second we will show how the economic contradictions and ideologems of socialist self-management contributed to the exhausting of the revolutionary Yugoslavia and started the *restoration of capitalism*. The contemporary post-Yugoslav model of transition situates the rupture of the old totalitarian regime in the year 1991 and frames it as the event that triggered the transition. This model presupposes a certain progression within a linear time schema, which always already contains a result (market and democracy). However, the modality of

→ extremely rare to think and practice revolutionary politics that targeted the destruction of the bourgeois State and Law on the one hand and exploitation on the other. Apart from Stalinist political practice, a well-documented and controversial theoretical debate took place in the French Communist Party (see Balibar 1976). The Chinese cultural revolution and the Yugoslavian model developed specific socialist paths that meant a precise break in the international workers' movement, both showing different shortcomings.

6 Also some non-Marxist research projects prove to be much more exact in showing the articulation of different historical processes, which characterises socialism. See Sabel & Stark (1982) and Sampson (1987).

7 See Althusser (2004), especially his "Marx in his Limits".

transition<sup>8</sup> that we employ is more complex and shows how in the specific historical conditions of Yugoslavia processes unfolded in a contradictory fashion. Yugoslavian development was full of detours, displacements and condensations that embodied specific contradictory movements called tendency<sup>9</sup>, which will be named *post-Fordist tendency*. At the end we will sketch paths to rethink this post-Fordist tendency, as a tendency of late capitalism, within socialist self-management. Isn't the identification of a socialist form of self-management with a capitalist form of post-Fordism a heretic political statement? How can one even compare the most developed form of the late capitalism, post-Fordism, with a socialist social formation?

## 2. Contextualisation of Self-Management and Post-Fordism, Capitalism and Socialism

How do post-Fordist theories define the post-Fordist tendency? They situate it correctly in the times of late capitalism, where they pinpoint the fundamental changes in the mode of production, especially concerning the organisation and nature of work. One of the focal points of their analysis is the novelty of immaterial, cognitive labour, which became the most productive and is paralleled with new technologies. Their theses have far-reaching theoretical effects for conceptualising the mode of exploitation and production of value,<sup>10</sup> which are arguably the

- 8 Our model of 'transition' is informed by Balibar's theory of transition (1970) and Bettleheim's (1975) conceptualisation of a concrete analysis of socialism(s). In this regard we have to specifically expose one of the fundamental contributions that Althusser brought to Marxism: his rethinking of time as non-homogeneous and structural causality as a critique of Hegelian and mechanistic causality. See Terray's (1993: 155-9) and Ichida's (1997) discussions on time.
- 9 In his analysis of the capitalist mode of production Karl Marx shows it is necessary to think tendency in terms of peculiar movements of contradiction. A fundamental characteristic of capitalism is precisely the point of unity of two contradictory tendencies, *combination* of the tendency rate of profit to fall and a tendency of the rate of surplus-value to rise. For further analysis of tendency, see Balibar (1968) and Lipietz (1993).
- 10 See the difference between 'labour force' and 'invention force' in the work of Yann Moulier Boutang (2007). About immaterial labour in general, see Lazzarato (1997).

most important concepts of Marxism. All post-Fordist theories detect a substantial transformation that was in progress in developed core countries. Amin Ash (1994) classifies these schools as the flexible specialisation school, the technological/neo-Schumpeterian school and the 'Regulation' school. To this list we add the 'optimist' post-Fordist school. Even though the theoretical focus of the schools lies with a different social force/agency of changes, they depart from the development in the capitalist core (Italy, Japan and USA). In other words, the tendency as such is taken as the alpha and omega of history; moreover, the tendency embodies the movement from the less developed to the more developed mode of production.<sup>11</sup> Schematically, all three approaches could be criticised because they all prioritise one 'agency': they put their faith in technology (the technological school), class compromise/state (the Regulation school) or multitude (the optimist post-Fordist). It is one of these agents that 'directs' or even determines the development of social relations and new regulations. Nevertheless, their critical theoretical analyses of the new forms of political economy are extremely important for our study and historical materialism in general.

Despite acknowledging their relevance our theoretical focus departs from the opposite angle: *post-Fordist elements were also at work in Yugoslavia from the mid 1960s onwards*. This thesis is influenced by Lenin's reflection on the Russian revolution: according to Lenin, a crystallisation of a tendency does not necessarily appear in the centre, quite the opposite, it is emphasised in the margins of the centre, at the juncture of different modes of production. Specific to the Yugoslav development was precisely its formation that was bordering on different types of economies, at the cross-section of capitalism and socialism. *In concreto*, post-Fordist characteristics can be

11 A highly problematic presupposition of this approach is its evolutionism. If the tendency is the most important referential point to understand time and development, we have to pose a question about the limitations of this theory to understand the structural conditions of the capitalist mode of production.

found in the 1965 market reforms, which attempted to respond to the crisis of the 'productivist' model. These reforms stressed the role of technocrats (managers) as leaders of the production process, innovation and knowledge in the industry (later reform of educational system), the role of 'participation' within the socialist enterprises and 'politicisation' of all social spheres. In other words, we are interested in the discovery of the post-Fordist elements, as analysed by post-Fordist theoreticians, but not in the capitalist core! Not only was there a crisis of the Fordist model in the capitalist centre, but there was also a crisis of the "productivist" model (socialist type of industrialisation and Taylorist organisation) within socialist (semi-)peripheries. This claim has to be read together with a work of Immanuel Wallerstein who consistently argued that the fall of 'communism' coincided with the demise of a Keynesian, social democratic capitalism in the 1970s and 1980s. The end of socialism immensely affected the end of the welfare state. Much more than a result of neo-liberal restructuring, it is above all a case of the collapse of socialism and the historical defeat of real socialisms. We are living in a post-socialist world and as such thinking socialism requires a serious theoretical effort, which might prove helpful in thinking and criticising totalitarian studies and the neo-liberalist monad of the end of history.

The following sections will provide analyses of the different instances of politics, ideology, law and economy.

### 3. Politics of Rupture

The Yugoslavian politics of rupture brought novelty, constructed a new world, a new Yugoslavia. It started something that was radically different from European politics of that time. We should think of Yugoslavia as an encounter between a new political subjectivity and a specific historical conjuncture. It broke with the existing order and it thought and activated itself in the direction of something 'not-yet-realised'.

We can reconstruct this political event via three historical moments (Riha 1993) that had considerable consequences for the world, not only for the specific Yugoslavian context. The emergence of the new Yugoslavia took place during

World War II when three historical sequences happened from 1941 till the late 1950s: 1941-45 (partisan politics, People's Liberation Struggle), 1948 (self-management, critique of Stalin) and 1955 (non-aligned movement). It is important to note that the first event had the strongest effects and made the new, socialist and multinational Yugoslavia materialise.

#### a.) People's Liberation Struggle

The partisan struggle was mainly organised by communists, apart from the struggle in Slovenia, where the Liberation Front gathered various antifascist forces that joined communists in the struggle for National Liberation. The partisans did not only fight against Nazi and Fascist occupation – Yugoslavia was divided between Italy, Hungary, the German Reich, Romania and Bulgaria –, but had to fight the political authorities of the old Yugoslavia, the local collaborators, Ustaša, Chetniks, Domobranici and other bourgeois forces. The formal recognition of partisans as the sole antifascist forces in the coalition came quite late, in 1943,<sup>12</sup> which is why the partisans had to concentrate on their own capacities. This historical situation 'forced' them to practice 'autonomist' politics.<sup>13</sup> The goal of the partisans was to organise a people's armed struggle against the occupation, but already during the war a social revolution took place. The partisans had a programmatic vision, which demanded a transformation of social relations and it was inscribed in the planetary socialist revolution. In the temporary liberated zones, as in large parts of Serbia (the republic of Užice was the first liberated zone in Europe, in August and September 1941) and parts of Bosnia and

12 Before British forces supported also royalist forces; Mihailović's Chetniks and also the Komintern (Moscow) ordered the partisans to join their struggle with Chetniks.

13 The Yugoslav communists already before that time started to organise politics detached from the dictate of Moscow. Yugoslavia was one of the few states in Europe that succeeded to autonomously liberate itself from the Nazi occupation. The Yugoslav resistance struggle grew into a Yugoslav army. At the end of the war the forces numbered more than 800,000. These military and political efforts can be seen as crucial for the continuation of the communist politics that autonomously transformed social relations during and after war.

Slovenia, local committees of liberation struggle were formed. These committees as new political forms practiced popular politics<sup>14</sup> and organised educational infrastructure, culture events, political meetings for the mobilisation of the masses and basic economical conditions. It was in these impossible conditions that art flourished; partisan poetry, graphic art, theatre and painting were the most important forms of artistic production with massive involvement of non-intellectuals.<sup>15</sup> The partisan struggle produced a revolutionary encounter between mass art and communist politics. Yugoslavia was one of the few states in Europe that was liberated from the Nazi occupation by its own forces. When Belgrade was liberated in 1944, the Soviet Red Army had to ask the partisans for permission to enter Yugoslav territory. The international recognition and autonomy of the partisan struggle was significant for the events that would follow World War II. We should dissect at least three referential points of this event that were internal to the new Yugoslavia and partisan subjectivity. Firstly, national liberation was conceived as a manifestation of solidarity of the masses as part of the international antifascist struggle (Buden 2003). Secondly, a social revolution, which entailed the introduction of new class relations and a transition to a communist, socialist Yugoslavia (see Kirn 2009 and Pupovac 2008). Thirdly, there was a cultural revolution, which meant the break with the bourgeois canons and art autonomy and the masses finding their way to the sphere of culture (Komelj 2009).

14 Instituted in the liberated territories, it existed under the domination of Communist Party, which was not the sole political force. It had to mobilise masses of farmers and intellectuals. The case of the Slovenian liberation struggle was even more complex. There was a broad coalition of leftist political groups that were united in the Liberation Front. Only in 1943, with the Dolomite declaration, groups agreed to the domination of the Communist Party.

15 The Communist Party, which was the leading force in the partisan struggle, supported art for the masses by the masses. Words became weapons when the masses took part in artistic practice and traditional literary canons were questioned. For an account of the relationship between partisan art and politics (see Komelj (2009) and Močnik (2005)). The partisan-resistance poetry in Slovenia was later collected in four massive volumes that testify to the immense literary production of the masses (Paternu 1998).

## b.) Self-Management as a Politics of anti-Stalinism

Most historians situate the beginnings of 'self-management' in the late 1940s.<sup>16</sup> *Self-management signified a definite break with Stalinism*. It emerged as a political form of anti-Stalinism, an alternative socialist development. After the consolidation of political power in the 1920s, Stalin established a socialist model that was to be used as a universal model for all future socialist states. This model amounted to socialism within one state, with special aid from the Soviet Union. The conflict between the Yugoslav Communist Party and Stalin's leadership had already existed during WWII and only grew stronger after the war. In 1948, the infamous *Informbiro* struggle took place and Yugoslavia was expelled from the socialist camp.<sup>17</sup> Facing a difficult international situation, from the civil war in Greece and the open question of Trieste (borders with Italy) to economic isolation, Yugoslavia was left to its own devices. After numerous debates in 1948, Party officials and the intelligentsia came up with a first systemic answer that formulated a different socialist politics. Interestingly, and not without irony, the Yugoslav socialist self-management was arguably the only successful case of socialism within one state and developed a substantial 'autarchic'

16 It was introduced in the legal documents from 1950 onwards.

17 To discuss the reasons for the conflict is not within the scope of this essay. We will just mention one of the most important reasons. There was a strong movement in the Balkans to set up a Balkan Socialist Federation. Yugoslavia, as the name already suggests, entailed a common denominator of "South Slaves". The Balkan Socialist Federation would unite the Albanian, Greek, Bulgarian and Yugoslav communist parties and working people. This process was thwarted by Churchill and Stalin, who during the Yalta conference (1945) divided the Balkan into two spheres of interests. Effectually, the Yalta agreement tended to stop any regional bottom-up development. For some historical background of the Socialist Federation, see Samary (1988).

economy (though it was never completely closed).<sup>18</sup> The Yugoslav economy was not only organised as the planned economy, as we will later show, new forms of production units emerged. Self-management had unanticipated political effects: ranging from a new way of work organisation and workers' participation to a new relationship between politics and economy. This meant a first radical break within the socialist movement that was manifested at an international level. One of the global and long-term consequences of the rupture was the non-aligned movement.

### c.) Non-Aligned Movement as Alternative to the Cold War Map

Most historical textbooks characterise the period between 1945 and 1990 as the Cold War era, which divided the world into two camps. This historical account is misleading, because a third camp, a different political formation, existed. This camp did not want to be ascribed to either of the imperialist blocs. The international politics that launched a non-aligned movement came into existence in Bandung 1955 and Yugoslavia was one of the key founders. The non-aligned movement promoted anti-colonial struggles. This was a political movement that was subtracted from the 'block' politics and produced a disruption in the Cold War map. It advocated a non-imperialist world constitution and a just organisation of international relations (Rubinstein 1970).

These three moments constitute the only revolutionary event that took place in 20<sup>th</sup>-century Yugoslavia. Yugoslav self-management politics meant a definite and final rupture with the existing social order. It is true that the most important part of these tri-partite politics is situated at its early stages. If the radicalness of the project started as a revolutionary war that transformed social relations, it was only the formulation of an anti-Stalinist critique and the non-aligned movement that

<sup>18</sup> Illegal paths between neighbouring countries existed throughout socialist times. More importantly, the Yugoslav economy started opening up to the West.

produced lasting consequences that transformed the shape of the globalised world. *Universalist politics brought global effects.*

#### 4. Fundamental Deadlock(s): Elements for a Critique of the Self-Management Ideology<sup>19</sup>

*Dictionnaire critique du Marxisme* (Labica et al 1999: 69-75) defines self-management firstly as the rejection of a bureaucratic form of management and secondly as the rejection of the Bolshevik model and social democracy. The entry in the *Dictionary* provides us with an analytical model that evaluates the ways in which the principles of self-management correspond with social reality. Yugoslav self-management passed the test on the first two moments, i.e. transforming society and social relations, whereas the third moment, the anti-institutional axis of the workers' politics, was in reality not part of the struggles, but only a formal guarantee. The beginnings of self-management had a strong political charge; its future development took quite a different and 'regressive' course. We name this shift the *self-managementisation* of society. The edginess and the politics of

19 Why the difference in naming? The discussion on the roots of the concept of *autogestión* is important. The word *autogestión* has a Greek and Latin etymology. The word *auto* comes from the Greek *autós* (self, same). *Gestión* comes from the Latin *gestio* (managing), which in turn comes from *gerere* (to bear, carry, manage). As Marcelo Vieta argues, drawing on Farmer's argument: "one can conceptualize it as 'self-gestation'—to self-create, self-control, self-provision, and, ultimately, self-produce; in other words, to practice *autogestión* means to be self-reliant. Tellingly, the English words 'gestate' and 'gestation' evolved from the word *gestion*. Taken together, *autogestión* alludes to an organic, biological, and process movement of creation and conception, having social political relevance in its implicit notion of immanence, becoming, and potentiality. Together, the words *auto* and *gestión* yield the perhaps inadequate English term 'self-management'" (2008). Self-management is connected to a workers' bottom-up organisation, desire to self-organise and self-create, but can be embedded in the capital itself. There is no need for romanticisation and the Yugoslav historical experience shows the dialectical turn in full light.

working people were lost through the process of consolidation of socialist power. Self-management became an official ideology that was promoted 'from above' and can be regarded as a bureaucratic reform, but nevertheless an important reform, that laid the foundations for new institutions. This reform had unanticipated effects, since a greater autonomy of production units meant a different development, which was not in line with the hard-line version of planned economy. Even though the politics of self-management opened up political space for economical innovations, its most stressed and intended political element, the dominance of workers, was not realised through the process. The politicisation of all aspects of social life occurred from 1950s onwards.

This formal framework does not tell us much about the concrete situation. By analysing it, we would like to extract the point of deviation. The latter was not a consequence of the inhumane ruling of communist bureaucracy (moralistic critique) that supposedly alienated itself from the masses, rather the regression is found in its humanistic core that advocated the happiness of individuals. We argue that *the self-management ideology revolved around the humanist ideal of the generic human being, which, quite paradoxically, got realised only in the post-Fordist reorganisation of late capitalism.*

Where can we situate this humanistic nexus? The latter can be easily exposed in the texts of the key Yugoslav ideologue, Edvard Kardelj (1979). The self-manager in the self-management society should strive for a specific goal, that is, for the realisation of the *generic man*. This troublesome presupposition is derived from the early Marx, which was ironically a reference to communist hard-line leadership and to communist dissidents – Praxis Marxism.<sup>20</sup> The heart of self-management consists of an identical ideal, which can be admittedly reached in different ways. Praxis philosophers advocated socialism with a human

20 Žižek correctly criticises 'Heideggerian' Marxists who believed that the essence of modern man can be found in the essence of self-management (2000: 13). This ties in with our thesis that official ideology and its unofficial critique became a double of the same ideological universe.

face, criticised the Party bureaucratic handling of power and wanted to employ only intellectual means so as not to get their hands dirty. Party functionaries lead society towards this identical ideal, but with other, i.e. *real-politik*, means. Both positions share a common goal, which is to realise generic man in a society without class conflicts.

The self-management vision of society definitely differed from the bourgeois ideology, even though both held generic man as a goal in future society. Bourgeois ideology sees society divided into the autonomous fields of economy, politics and culture. Also, in the liberal view, each individual is responsible for his happiness. In contrast to this, the self-management ideology does not posit the origin of happiness in human beings. Further, it does not recognise the autonomisation of social spheres. In self-management politics, the self-manager would not operate only in the economic sphere, but in society in general. The worker becomes a central reference, which cuts society and makes sense of the imaginary relation between individual and society, to put it in Althusserian terms. Instead of the avant-garde role of the bureaucracy, which would assign workers their places, we get a totality of self-managed workers, who would be able to 'inhabit' all structural places. The enlightenment touch of the self-managed society seconds a basic ontological claim: all workers are thinking beings. The new institutions such as the workers' council and local spatial communities are assigned an important role in political decisions. But we should ask ourselves, what was the basis of this ideological superstructure?

The material basis of self-management was the economic unit, a self-managed type of enterprise called Basic Organisation of Associated Labour (BOAL).<sup>21</sup> Every worker was supposed to take part in decisions about the economic actions of BOAL. This ideal economic subject was seen as a political model to be instituted in the whole of society. New

21 This production unit differs from cooperative kolhoz (Soviet Union) or Chinese people's communes. However, it is not in our range to analyse these difference. For a detailed definition and the functions of BOALs, see Kardelj (1979).

institutions were designed to facilitate the worker's autonomy in the sphere of production and in general. However, the self-management presupposition was unable to escape the condition of a genuinely humanist ideology. Man had to be prioritised in society. And how should we attain the so-called generic man in more concrete terms?

The centre of socialist emancipation remained stuck in the theory of alienation. If we look carefully, we cannot miss a central stake that was at work in this narrative, the stake that was loyal to a certain way of reading young Marx. Marx criticised Feuerbach on the point of religion: a critique of religion and God is not enough; a critique of real material relations is necessary. Only in that way can we consider real, human emancipation. In short, Marx's *German Ideology* (1845) sets the origins of alienation in the division of labour. Impersonal social domination is at work in the labour process and the worker is separated from his product. The relations among individuals get objectified through the production process and the overall division of labour.<sup>22</sup> The abolition of the division of labour was one of the principal goals of self-management and was read in line with Marx's romanticisation of 'generic man'. This 'generic man' will be able to undertake many activities, as a famous passage from Marx's *German Ideology* goes: "society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner".<sup>23</sup> Once the division of labour is abolished,<sup>24</sup> a true de-alienation

22 An elaboration of the theory of alienation can be found in the theory of 'commodity fetishism' in *Capital*. Our project, inspired by Althusser's critique of the humanist Marx, dissects precisely the humanist kernel of self-management.

23 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm>.

24 It is curious to see that even a firm communist line adopted by Balibar in his *Dictatorship of proletariat* (1976) advocated the goal of the abolition of division of labour. Can we not argue that the insistence on the abolition of division of labour paved the path for human emancipation (post-Marxism) and the abandonment of the revolutionary project?

would happen and a new self-managed subject would emerge. The productive potential of each worker would be freed from the objectified processes at work in capitalist production. Thus, the self-managed worker became everyone, or rather he could occupy all social positions ('structural places'). He was a *total Träger*: worker as bureaucrat, worker as technocrat (manager) and worker as worker. At first glance we can find an egalitarian maxim at work in this idea, namely all community members can do anything. But as we will see later, the fundamental condition of alienation in socialism has not disappeared. Despite the redistribution of wealth the structural conditions that reproduced inequality and class relations were not abolished. Thus, the self-management maxim is based on the presupposition of the abolition of the division of work, which was not the key target set by Marx. Self-management ideology hypostasised an ideal figure of the self-manager that necessitated the emergence of the new Man: not only a shock worker, but also a shock bureaucrat and a shock manager.

In order to avoid any misunderstandings, we do not want to do away with a maximal engagement in communist politics, but we insist to look for the primary contradiction that was created in the socialist social conditions. Afterwards the maximal human engagement can spread its wings. Making the worker figure universal has to be considered together with the abolition of the division of labour – and not the abolition of commodity labour itself –, which was one of the most substantial humanist goals. The theory of socialist emancipation concentrated on the aspects of alienation and remained blind for the perspective of class struggles within socialism. Its intervention into social relations – the reorganisation of the labour relations and redistribution of value – meant that the socialist state produced conditions for a social just society. This makes it different from the capitalist welfare state, but in no way makes it qualify for a communist society.

When reading the humanist imperative of 'generic man' closely it simply makes us associate it with the contemporary post-Fordist perspective. We can rightly ask ourselves if today's situation is not similar, since each of us has to acquire new knowledge all the time, since we have to develop our potentials

in order to come closer to self-realisation and happiness.<sup>25</sup> We have to be skilful and we can become anyone. We will illustrate 'self-management's *condition humaine*' by taking the example of a typical researcher today. The researcher does not only undertake research at an institute, university or a firm, but has to develop multiple organisational skills: establishing an academic network, becoming a manager (apply for funding, organise conferences, publish extensively) and also taking on bureaucratic tasks, the most important being to justify the research's usefulness. However, this is not typical only of researchers in academia, because innovation, creativity, intellectuality are the imperatives of post-Fordism for anyone entering the labour force market. The utopian potential of the generic and creative subject that came into existence in the bosom of self-management socialism reached its peak and realisation in the post-Fordist regime. The self-realisation of the contemporary cognitive worker is attained in one way or another: either through financial incentives or through fear of losing one's job. If the ideology of creativity works impeccably, then workers enjoy their jobs. Every day they are becoming more creative and efficient.

Let us return to our original criticism of the division of labour. This division did not disappear in times of self-management. The distribution of tasks and functions has become even more specialised and refined in the new network of institutions and experts. Not only was there a division between and within production units, this labour division was interiorised in the producer too. *The so-called abolition of the division of labour led to new forms of exploitation in the self-*

25 Happiness has been about investment of politics for a long time, since Jacobins but today as well (see Žižek 2001a). It is necessary to include a Foucauldian perspective, because it is almost impossible to conceptualise contemporary phenomena such as 'happiness studies' and psychology research that deal with 'burned-out' people in terms of the imperative: how to stay productive and happy. The relation between power and knowledge has become very transparent and obviously characteristic of cognitive labour conditions.

*management system*. Thus, the abolition of labour division was the necessary illusion of self-management that parallels the abolition of labour division in post-Fordism. In the late 1960s<sup>26</sup> the abolition of hierarchies was called for as well as a higher level of freedom in enterprises by workers and students. In Yugoslavia, the 'enlightened' communist leadership started this project almost two decades earlier, with similar results. The demands of social critique in 1968 were translated: they wanted enjoyment and they got regulation of enjoyment. The regulation/post-Fordist regime brought more freedom, but also produced new forms of exploitation. One of the key post-Fordist theoreticians, Boutang, excellently shows the demise of both Taylorist organisation and Adam Smith's notion of the division of labour (a reduction of complex to simple labour, division of intellectual and manual labour, specialisation): any rigid or general division of labour blocks the coordination of complex operations and cooperation.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, production is much more organised in the framework of new cognitive criteria, whereas the old conceptualisation of surplus value has been transformed (Boutang 2007: 87-92). Within the new post-Fordist regime parts of cognitive criteria such as participation, knowledge sharing, networking, managing, and cooperation, which intend to realise human potential and abolish the formal division of labour, are in fact exploitative moments of production.

To sum up, self-management and post-Fordism have at least two common characteristics: humanism and new forms of exploitation, with cooperation and participation becoming crucial in the (self-)managing of the production process. While self-management could not realise the ideal of the 'generic man', post-Fordism 'succeeded' in this mission.

26 See Brian Holmes' analysis of flexible personality in times of post-Fordism and especially his understanding of May '68 (2002).

27 We have to say that the division of labour still exists. Are we not today witnessing a truly global(ised) division of labour (see Arrighi 2007 and Harvey 2000)? When we contextualise the 'post-Fordist' tendency in the world-system perspective we can claim that the abolition of labour remains only an illusion.

## 5. Self-Management and the Role of Law: Property

We are interested in law, because precisely this instance and its (non-)theorisation was crucial in rethinking the transition towards a communist society. This is exposed in the socialist understanding of expropriation and the concept of social property. Our thesis is that the socialist interpretation of the constitution of the community remained rooted in the tradition of social contract theories, where politics and law stand in a very close relationship.

Beside the humanist ideology, one of the major restrictions of historical materialisms is the absence of a consistent theory of law.<sup>28</sup> Scholastically, Marxism placed the law on the level of superstructure, which consists of political-juridical institutions and ideology. I would like to refer here to a vulgar Marxist assumption: *the (economic) infrastructure determines superstructure and the primacy is assigned to the productive forces* (one part of the economic base). This thesis presupposes a definite concept of development, industrialisation, with technology as the most important force. This thesis was in Yugoslavia reflected in the advocacy of the 'productionist' model (massive industrialisation). The sacred mechanism of alienation on the level of the human being received its complementary mechanism on the level of the community where the law entered the stage with all its mechanism. The abolition of private property is a signal of communist society. However, the 'socialist' reading implied a peculiar identification: it equated economic and legal property, reducing law to the epiphenomenon of economy. Although we cannot expect more from a scholastic scheme of society, we have to ask ourselves whether this argumentation is not in contradiction with its own departure. The change of property relations – the abolition of private property – was implemented in Yugoslavia by the politics of nationalising the means of production and the collectivisation of the land after

<sup>28</sup> There are some Marxist thinkers of the theory of law, such as Pashukanis (1980), but generally the theory of law is shed insufficient light on.

World War II. It was hoped that the transformation of private property into state property (via nationalisation) would resolve and abolish capitalist contradictions.<sup>29</sup> Self-management took a step further when expropriating the state of the property over means of production. In Yugoslavia, property became social; formally there were no proprietors.<sup>30</sup>

If ideologues remained loyal to their scholastic position (infrastructure determines superstructure) it would be a little awkward to keep insisting that the change in property relations (law as superstructure) will change the base. How could merely the abolition of private property result in communism? This simplified framework did not shed light on production relations in its entirety. New legal relations and social property did not mean that Yugoslavia entered communism. There was no formal proprietor of the means of production, but this did not mean there were no class relations.<sup>31</sup>

Socialist theoreticians in Yugoslavia (and elsewhere) completely disregarded the most important issue of historical materialism: the problem of exploitation and class struggle. They focused on the question of property. Their reasoning was mechanistic: the agents who appropriate value are no longer the private capitalists. Therefore, capitalism is no longer effective. In the case of Yugoslavia, it is true that nationalisation was firmly established after World War II, as a result of which the state became the biggest owner and socialist theoreticians could rightfully make mention of state property. State property would later be replaced by the social property in self-managed society.

29 For a substantial and extensive critique of socialist economists and ideologues in Yugoslavia, see the excellent analysis of Bavčar, Kirn and Korsika (1985).

30 One of the key Yugoslav legal theoreticians, Bajt (1988), explained the contributions of self-management in the field of property. See also Brborić-Likić (2003).

31 That is why Althusser's reading of law as a specific instance is fruitful. According to historical conditions law is always differently articulated to other instances (overdetermination; determination). Even though Althusser never developed a theory of law, there is some sketch in his *Sur la reproduction* (1995) that I have tried to reconstruct in another article (2007).

The objective was that property would belong to everybody. However, the expropriation of private owners is not a communist, but socialist political practice, which does not make an end to class contradictions. The means of production were not under the workers' control. Instead of continuing the long-term revolution, it was stopped. The politics of expropriation lead to a greater socialisation of capital and the distribution of property and riches, which was definitely more 'just' and humane in socialism than in capitalism.

However, as Marx already analysed in the third volume of *Capital*, the tendency of the socialisation of capital is internal to the development of capitalism. Capital permeates all social spheres. Activities that belonged to other spheres/modes of production, such as affective labour, communal work, are more and more 'hijacked' by capitalist valorisation. On the other hand, socialisation means the emancipation of capital from capitalists to some degree. With the development of credits and financial capital comes the rise of the managerial fraction, which manages/organises the enterprise. The managerial revolution introduced a strategic place in the capitalist mode of production. Balibar's scheme of capitalist social relations demonstrates the part of the worker, where workers and also managers are not owners of the means of production, while on the part of the non-worker, the capitalist is the owner (1970). This scheme shows that managers do not self-evidently belong to the side of the capital. On the contrary, he sides with the work, structurally. Nevertheless, due to his knowledge and his position within the production process, this scheme should be extended when talking about specific political struggles/alliances. The rise of financial capital, the reorganisation of the work regimes and the new form of exploitation put the manager in line with the capitalist. It is the struggle between capitalists and managers that becomes a capitalist class struggle, or more precisely the struggle of the ruling class. It is only through political struggles that the ruling class is formed. It cannot be derived from a pure economic scheme. The coalition between managers and workers is a naïve and economist presupposition, which does not happen through a socialisation of capital. Let us add that in Yugoslavia there were not many cases of this presupposed coalition. The socialisation

of capital is a tendency internal to the capitalist development, whereas the socialist politics of expropriation aggravated this development. In socialism this transformation was at certain historical points dominated by labour and not just by capital.

## Contract and Self-Managed Social Contract

The legal (contractual) dimension is intertwined with a particular economic and political determination. Marx was well aware of the legal horizon as constitutive to the bourgeois world, its cornerstone resting on the division of civil society (*bourgeois*) and state (*citoyen*). This cornerstone is sutured by contract, which is the key reference that guarantees the equality and freedom of the abstract individual. Contract as the key instance in bourgeois society – can something similar be claimed about Yugoslavian socialism? Undoubtedly, the contract did not disappear from society or from the reproduction of production relations. The contract remained a document between the free and equal self-managed worker and the enterprise (BOAL). This directly has to do with the question of wages, which was of a collective nature. After the initial strict regulation of prices and wages, level market reforms in 1965 granted the worker a more favourable position in the negotiation process. Ordinarily the politics of wages were discussed by many different agents (working organisation, trade unions, councils) on many levels (federal, republic, local), which eventually led to a collective contract in a branch. Another quite fascinating perspective can be traced back to the beginnings of the Yugoslav cultural industry. Pavle Levi describes the situation of flexible contract in the film industry 1950s in following way: “Workers’ councils were thus introduced as decision-making bodies overseeing film production, distribution, and exhibition, while the creative personnel associated with the process of filmmaking (directors, cinematographers, screenwriters) were given the status of freelance professionals” (2007: 15). The law on the collective and individual levels of freelancers played an important part in articulating workers relations. It remained a key reproductive mechanism of socialist economy.

On a more political level Yugoslavia was famous for its constant reforms and new constitutions, which defined

socialist relations. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia during its general congress accepted a programme which was then implemented. The programme was translated into legal material. Once accepted, there was no possible discussion; any deviation would be severely criticised. The principle of democratic centralism was firmly in practice during the whole period of self-management. The correct interpretation of the legal material was taken by the main ideologist Edvard Kardelj. This makes us wonder how it was possible that against the background of self-management – that was based on Lenin's idea of the withering away of the state – enormous production of legal material was made. By implementing this vast body of legal documents, the belief in the law was established. Let us not forget that the Yugoslavian 1974 constitution was the longest constitution ever written. Why are law and state so important if the self-management idea wants their abolition? Legal instruments should have enabled the dispersion of political power on various levels to many self-management interests groups. But how could the idea of 'withering away of state' that was attempting to construct community beyond law, fail so bluntly behind its initial push and revolutionary beginnings of Yugoslav community? The logic of the law continued to be a necessary reference to socialist ideologues and practices. The more it tried to avoid it, the more it continued to be bound to it.

The main Yugoslav communist ideologist Edvard Kardelj<sup>32</sup> was aware of the ideological function of the law. He knew that an exclusively 'legal' solution would not suffice to realise the transition to communism. He made a step into the right direction by pointing to the crucial problem: how to produce self-managed subjectivity, or rather, how to attain the working class consciousness? This goal needs to be fulfilled for workers to control prices and the production process, to decide what products to purchase, how to coordinate activities. One way

32 His major texts came as a 'quilting point' of the League of Yugoslav Communists' Congresses, and even more importantly, after the inauguration of new Yugoslav constitutions, Kardelj was setting the correct reading for future interpretations.

was to institute the working council within the BOAL, where workers could effectuate decisions through the council. But the other question was, who will delegate the councils and how are these delegates supposed to take pertinent decisions? Without this 'subjective' moment, the constitution of the self-managed community is unthinkable. Kardelj offered no solution to this issue; he just inferred the problem. When we take a closer look at this central question, we can detect a typical problem of the social contract theory.

Already Rousseau was aware of the problem that the *social contract* posed: how can a community be constituted of nothingness? Or rather, who enters into the contractual relationship? What is the relationship between the members and the future community? Even though this original act is imaginary, it has effects on understanding the sheer nature of authority and continuation of revolution. The continuation of the revolutionary project can happen with non-legal means. The 'not-yet-existing' of the (coming) community, the Real, was not explicitly thematised in the theories of the social contract. Each political theory that wants to rethink the rupture in the light of its consequences has to target this dimension of the Real and work with it.<sup>33</sup> Kardelj never found an appropriate answer, as he remained within the scope of legal ideology. The rupture with the state of nature, with pre-war Yugoslavia, meant novelty, something unimaginable in that conjuncture, 'not-yet-realised', but that political act was later transformed into the legitimisation of the new socialist order. Was at any point in the self-managing Yugoslavia this origin of contract or legal instance undermined or transformed? The pure legal approach comes at the point when it presents itself as abstract, neutral, non-contradictory (effacing the struggle), and as the only possible way for thinking politics.<sup>34</sup> But the issue of any progressive political theory is to 'unmake' the law as the ultimate horizon of politics (*fait accompli*).

33 The problem of politics of rupture and maintaining this rupture, a novelty in the constituting state, is a problem posed by Machiavelli. The latter should be closer to socialist tradition than Rousseau.

34 On the non-reflected legal horizon of the constitution, see Negri (1999); on the nature of law, see Althusser (1995).

Admittedly, the theorists of the social contract addressed the question of property, which is not explicitly the question of production relations, but still targets them. The social contract presupposes an egalitarian principle: everyone has to give up everything in order to have it returned. According to Rousseau this act is called total alienation: its “clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one – the *total alienation* of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community” (SC I, VI, 1966: 12). Even though the conditions of this leap into the realm of the social contract are egalitarian, it still serves the richer, because once the social contract is implemented, the rich are guaranteed that their property is protected. Some are more ‘included’, but equal rules apply for everyone. The individual becomes free and equal. This differs from the feudalistic conception of social positions which would be acquired with birth. The natural inequality was abolished, but other inequalities sneaked in, as Marx already hinted at. And socialist Yugoslavia was no exception in this rule.

Althusser indicated that the real *discrepancy* of the contract can be situated in the hidden presupposition: at the moment of signing the contract there is no community (RP2) with which the individual (RP1) makes the contract:

The ‘peculiarity’ of the Social Contract is that it is an exchange agreement concluded between two RPs (like any other contract), but one in which the second RP does not pre-exist the contract since it is its product. The ‘solution’ represented by the contract is thus pre-inscribed in one of the very conditions of the contract, the RP2, since this RP2 is not pre-existent to the contract. (1972: 130)<sup>35</sup>

Also, in the case of the Yugoslav self-management model, the existing contract contained a paradoxical entity – the paradox

35 Althusser did not yet address the issue of ‘not-yet-existing’ when reading Rousseau. This problem is fully exposed in his reading of Machiavelli (2000).

Self-managed worker (RP1)	Type of exchange ← →	Self-managed community (RP2)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Original act: Total alienation of <i>means of production</i></li> </ul>	Transfer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>State property</i> (later social property)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Schema of social-economic relations Worker: labour force (production)</li> </ul>	Appropriation of 'surplus value'	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bureaucracy (plan)</li> <li>• Technocrats (organisation)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Schema of political power Working people</li> </ul>	Re-presentation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communist Party</li> <li>• Bureaucracy - political representatives</li> <li>• Technocracy - economic representatives</li> </ul>

Table of the Social Contract of the Self-Managed Community

between non-existent self-managed workers (not self-governed) and pending self-managed community.

Exchange is constitutive of every contract. Members have to alienate all means of production to the community. The operation of equality is reversed in the self-managed schema. The means of production are expropriated from the ones who had assets; in other words, they will lose their property. This 'unequal' principle guarantees the future social equality in the new community. Thus, the former expropriators were expropriated by the socialist state, which facilitated the transition and distribution of the means of production and products within society. In the self-managed society, a new contract (and constitution) was established to take one further step. The property would become completely social; both the means of production and the products would be at the disposal of the workers.

Notwithstanding a formal guarantee there was a hidden element in this constellation since this mediation between the community and the individual does not unfold on its own. What were the actual agents that made contracts and laws? Were these in the power of workers' councils? The historical facts lead us in a different direction, the League of Communist of Yugoslavia (LCY), was the agent that embodied *volonté générale*. The LCY first prepared and, once it was agreed on, interpreted the contract.

Ideally, the contract would imply the realisation of worker control over the means of production. However, this general contract did not prevent further legislation from taking place. It is quite naïve and typically liberal to presuppose that the existence of an enlightened constitution and moral responsibility will make the ruling class respect these laws. This shows a fundamental incomprehension of the political reality and a failure to take into account over-determination: politics is a field of struggle, whereas the legal form is embedded in political and ideological struggles (interpretations). In socialist reality this meant that the outcomes of the class struggle for the dominant class were synthesised in an additional legislative corpus and in political struggles within the apparatuses. The effects of class struggle in the Yugoslavian socialist formation exposed contradictions at work within the legal-political foundation of the self-managed community.

Let us return for a moment to the capitalist mode of production, to the articulation of law and economy, which might help us understand the role of law in socialism. As indicated by Marx, each historical epoch realises a different relationship between law and property relations. We very much agree with how Balibar interpreted the distinction between (legal and economic) property and (political) appropriation. Starting off from this distinction in the production process, property can be described as the “operation between things, which the capitalist purchased” (1970: 214) from the perspective of the capital and as a separation of the direct producer from the means of production from the perspective of labour (property-less). The non-worker, the capitalist, is the owner (property) in the production process, in which he appropriates the surplus-labour:

capital is the owner of all the means of production *and* of labour, and therefore it is the owner of the entire product. But the first does not designate a property relation: it belongs to the analysis of what Marx called the ‘labour process’, or rather it situates the analysis of that labour process as part of the analysis of the mode of production. Nowhere in it does the capitalist intervene *as an owner*, but only the labourer, the means of labour and the object of labour. (213)

Lipietz elaborated on some of Balibar's theses. As he quite rightly asserts, there is a substantial difference between "property/juridical property, borne by the same *supports* (means and things), but in places inscribed in two *different* and relatively autonomous instances" (1993: 108). Moreover, "the relation of 'economic ownership' has as a condition of existence (was over-determined by) the relation of juridical ownership" (ibid: 111). The juridical right of property is logically different: legal relation deals with the contractual relationship between persons (legal subjects), whereas property relations codify relations between persons and things.

Appropriating surplus value, it being a political form of exploitation (class struggle) is one thing, legal support (property of the capitalist) and economical property is quite another. In self-management socialism many different forms of property coexisted: private, municipal, state and social, to name but a few. How were they translated into economic practices? Even though remaining within the horizon of the bourgeois law (property), legal forms were the outcome of political struggles in the political-economic sphere. Appropriation is not necessarily in the domain of the capitalist. With the growing power of technocracy/management the *organisation of production* itself became an actual form of appropriation of surplus value. In Yugoslavian socialism the surplus value was divided between two factions: the technocracy and bureaucracy and they decided upon further distribution. The technocracy became an important agent of appropriation, as it dominated production units – BOALs. Conversely, a portion of surplus value was still appropriated by the bureaucracy for planning and funding central financial agencies.<sup>36</sup>

36 Charles Bettelheim also contributed to considering this articulation between politics, economy and law. He distinguished three different moments in the production process: holding, possession and property. Their specific combination then defines a type of property. The relationship of immediate producers and means of productions with a possible use of products is taken into account as a basic matrix of his distinction (1975: 57-96).

## 6. Class Struggle in Yugoslav Self-Management Socialism

In this part we are firmly relying on the book *Delo+Kapital v SFRJ*<sup>37</sup>, the only real critique of Yugoslav political economy. We extrapolated the following thesis, which we will elaborate: *class struggle as part of the self-management model continued to exist, although in different forms: the primal contradiction remained the one between labour and capital. The primal aspect of class struggle took place between bureaucracy and technocracy, which formed a ruling class, while the workers were a secondary aspect.*

A specific step forward in the development of socialism conceptualised the transfer of state property to social property, under which conditions workers would take over the control of the production process. This great leap never took place. A central reason for the failure of the self-management model lies in fact that the social relations among workers within production units and in the political sphere were not dominated by the (working) masses,<sup>38</sup> but by representatives of state political apparatuses and BOAL's management, both of which participated in economy and, as said, appropriated the surplus value produced by workers. In the Yugoslav self-management model, the most visible form of economic class struggle occurred among bureaucrats and technocrats. A typical objection would be that despite the formal guarantee of workers participation, the actual (political) reality was very different. The socialist critique of western human rights and formal democracy could be turned against existing socialism. The working people were absent from the political and to a certain extent also from the economic decisions. Let us make clear that we do not consider self-management as a direct democracy of working people and their total control of society. This would be a naïve belief in transparency of everything and

37 The study *Work and Capital in SFRY* was written by Bavčar, Kirn and Korsika (1985). We refer to them as the authors of SFRY.

38 See also Bettelheim (1975: 96). There are three moments of mass politics, which involved broad participation from the part of the masses: World War II, the late 1960s and mid-1980s.

everyone. *Yugoslav politics of rupture consisted of a specific encounter between communist activists (Party) and the masses.*<sup>39</sup>

It was this encounter that formed the spontaneity of the mass movement and triggered the socialist revolution. As we already showed in the first part, the self-management model did not exist in the international workers' movement. It was something new, opening up the possibility of something 'not-yet-there', unimaginable, handling this tension between the possible and impossible. Self-management is an encounter between the communist leadership and the masses and does not prevent political experimentation that is in line with communist goals.<sup>40</sup> The workers' self-management does not mean 100% cooperation of the masses and complete control of the whole of society, which some dissidents could easily deem as totalitarianism of the masses. The complete cooperation of the masses on all levels of economic activities is not even possible; it could become destructive and life-threatening. We rather not imagine what would happen if there was a constant debate about the train schedule by all railroad workers. Certain economic and social processes need to be concisely and centrally managed due to the specialisation of procedures. The failure of the Yugoslav self-management model lies somewhere else. Firstly, after the WWII the relation between masses and Party started weakening. Secondly, how open and accessible were functions in enterprises and political institutions? What did the communist leadership do in order to open up and incite critical discussions? How did the Yugoslavian authorities implement a development model for attaining greater equality between nations and working people? Were there some genuine cases of workers'

39 Partisan struggle was from the beginning a popular phenomenon, but one cannot say that 100% of the people took up arms and fought against the occupation. As said, also collaborators were active in war-time Yugoslavia.

40 Admittedly, the communist goals and the ways in which politics are formulated need to be decided on in political practice. To prescribe the programme in a democratic centralist way has not been an instance of very successful politics. These questions have a long and complex history in popular struggles, discussions on the Left and far Left, between anarchists, communists, socialists and others.

self-management and if so did the authorities back or reject them? To simply adhere to and support the former policies of communist leadership would in the last instance mean to remain conservative Marxist. To rely on the directives coming from the top did not really mean to practice workers' self-management or to incite workers' participation. The political principle of the Yugoslav communists remained democratic centralism, which advocated the vanguard role of the Party. One had to enter the established political apparatus, which at the end of the day prevented an encounter with working people. There were historical moments when masses entered the stage. But this happened rarely and with very different, even tragic results.<sup>41</sup>

Our critique of self-management is not merely formal as we would like to refer to the point where class struggles took place in the socialist formation. The most visible struggle took place between bureaucrats and technocrats. Bureaucrats represented the 'social capital' (state property), whereas technocrats represented 'autonomous capitals' (BOAL).<sup>42</sup> The latter were in charge of innovation and planning on the level of enterprise, because they possessed the 'know-how'. Conversely, bureaucrats regulated the macro-economy by directing flows of investments and deploying big strategic projects (planned economy). Economic class struggle was the principal aspect of this contradiction, whose effects synthesised in a compromise within the ruling class. The temporary outcomes of the struggle

41 This raises the problem of the politics of the masses. As Balibar has shown in political philosophy there was always fear of masses (1994), which in many ways theoretically blocked even thinking what the entering of the masses in the field of politics would mean. Also, one cannot just idealise the masses and think the politics of masses are from the start more emancipatory. The handling of mass movements was quite symptomatic in the Yugoslav history. If in the 1970s some of extreme nationalistic tendencies were repressed by the communist leadership (in a definitely problematic way), a much graver tendency could be detected in the 1980s, when the Left opposition was repressed, while the rightwing gained momentum within and outside of political apparatus.

42 A similar analysis could apply to other countries of the socialist block, with the specific difference taken into account. As was already stressed, the Yugoslavian model implied different production units, a political organisation of the economy and more political participation in society.

were secured in new constitutions of Yugoslavia, which entailed a further institutionalisation via economic legislation and a re-organisation of political institutions. This aspect is essential to understand the economic policies of the socialist formations and the new modes of regulation in specific historical moments. These processes were manifested through establishing and closing down financial institutions (fund for development, fund for investment...).<sup>43</sup> In the period of the 1960s technocrats started dominating different institutions. Let us briefly touch upon the example of banks, as the most symptomatic institutional loci of power struggles. Smaller banks were given a greater role vis-à-vis the Central Bank that was in control of the federal bureaucracy. Banks became more autonomous and had more money to circulate. This meant more credits for economic activities of the BOALs and, consequently, economic expansion of 'autonomous capitals'. More and more, technocrats were getting involved on the level of the republics, via different political institutions that represented the self-managed interests. Struggles occurred between factions of bureaucracies, whereas the federal bureaucracy had to struggle against the bureaucracy of the republics. The latter supported the technocracy and its liberal programmes to open up and direct the Yugoslav economy toward the West, to build infrastructure for tourism, motorways, to sponsor economic activities in the parts of Yugoslavia that were already developed. The situation was affected by the market reform in 1965 which got famous for its 4-D motto: *de-politisation, decentralisation, de-etatisation and democratisation* (Brborić-Likić 2003). The technocracy further gained political power and advocated 'market' against 'plan'. In the beginning, the Yugoslavian bureaucracy was a dominant part of the ruling class, but from the late 1960s on, the dominance shifted in favour of the technocrats. Through these struggles the ruling class came into existence.

Yugoslav socialist economists based their analyses on a particular interpretation of value-form supposedly independent

43 For a historical analysis of institutions, see the authors of SFRY (1985), Horvat (1985) and Samary (1988).

of capital. Symptomatically, they centred on the first chapter of *Capital*. Socialist economists, according to the authors of SFRY, “elevate value form of product in a specific kind of transhistorical determination of all modes of production or more precisely of all modes of exchange of products” (1985: 14). As the famous Yugoslav communist ideologist Kardelj used to say: “commodity production and market are a form of free exchange of labour between self-managers” (Bavčar et al 1985: 14). However, authors advocate the thesis that any determination of value has a historically specific character, regardless of whether we are talking about capitalism or socialism. In contradistinction to the socialist economists, the authors of SFRY argue that “only in capitalism commodity form of production and exchange started dominating over the whole economic scene” (ibid.: 22). Characteristic of capitalism is not only that people exchange, but that they are placed into the position of inequality. But in Yugoslav socialism, the reality of commodity relations, overtly recognised by the official ideologue, was also dominant in the economy. Kardelj claimed that commodity production or the market itself is not a source of inequality or capitalist relations, while the authors of SFRY replied that the individual commodity is inextricably bound up with labour force. The latter can only be established on the basis of an unequal distribution of conditions of production, therefore it remains rooted in the relationship between capital and labour (1985: 10-35).

According to Marx the fundamental separation/*Trennung*<sup>44</sup> within capitalism is a separation of the worker from the means of production that are in the hands of the capitalist class. In Yugoslavia’s socialist formation, this separation is suspended by the state, which should eventually lead to the workers controlling their means of production. This separation was ‘relativised’ by the state, because it was not the ‘capital’ but the state that possessed the means of production and the process of appropriation of value continued to exist. In the socialist economy two separations occurred. The first separation took place on

44 For a detailed analysis of the concept of *Trennung*/*Scheidung* in Marx, see Močnik (1999).

the level of the market, the separation between *production units* (enterprises), while the second separation was between managers (technocrats) and workers within the enterprise.

The first separation – between different BOALs – engendered a class struggle that materialised in various ways: through competition between various BOALs, growing differences between the republics of Yugoslavia and fights for setting product prices and the level of money-circulation (crediting). This was the *Kampfplatz* of the ruling class. It is true that the state (bureaucracy) with the help of the Central Bank could maintain the level of prices to a certain degree; prices of the most important products were particularly regulated by the central authorities. However, state agency instruments coexisted with the mechanism that was dominated by the technocracy, but was also market-orientated and could not be controlled. The conditions of production were more favourable in the more developed parts of Yugoslavia: certain BOALs were technologically more advanced; the authorities of some republics brought about a larger fluctuation of money and a higher level of investment. This resulted in differences in the economic capacities of the BOALs generally, and in prices differences specifically (competition). As figures show, there was massive non-development in Yugoslavia: the differences between republics did not remain status quo or diminished as was expected. Quite on the contrary, the striking economic gap between Slovenia and Kosovo continuously increased (see table of incomes and living standards in Bavčar et al 1985: 64). The industries in more developed regions ‘exploited’ the less developed. This structural gap was constitutive to the reproduction of the regional inequalities. The economic crisis in the 1980s also hit the undeveloped part of Yugoslavia to a much bigger extent.<sup>45</sup> Even stricter measures of the state political apparatus could not prevent this expanding gap, whilst commodity production still dominated planned production.

45 These policies were implemented by a dictat of international financial institutions (IMF, WB) and only deepened the crisis. It was one of the reasons for the break-up of Yugoslavia. See comprehensive studies of Magaš (1993) and Woodward (1995a).

The second separation cut through the socialist enterprises. As shown in the departing thesis of the section, the secondary aspect of the principal contradiction is that of the self-managed workers. Yugoslavia was proclaimed a state of 'working people(s)', yet there were at least two deadlocks that thwarted political participation in the emerging self-managed community. We already exposed the logic of (liberal) *contractualism* as part of the legal-political foundation. Another central limitation of socialist political theory and practice can be found in the central liberal ideologem and logic: the representation of the people. The representation did not work in a typical parliamentary fashion, but was mediated on many levels. We could say a certain mix of corporatism and a complex system of delegation represented as many social segments as possible. Even though local political organisations in some regions enjoyed a quite active political engagement from the workers, the majority of vital decisions was still coordinated and directed by the consolidated political apparatus, the League of Yugoslav Communists. In the last instance it was precisely this 'quilting point' of Party and the State that blocked *mass* politics (Badiou 1998). To paraphrase Mastnak's evaluation of Yugoslav self-management (1982): the Communist Party's representation of the proletariat became the Party's representation of capital (individual and social). In the sphere of production, specifically within the BOAL, the technocracy dominated and acquired a majority in all workers' councils. Apart from the dominance within politics and economy, the technocrats organised and hegemonised the production of knowledge (new universities) from the 1960s onwards.<sup>46</sup> Instead of an encounter

46 It would take us too far to analyse cultural hegemony in Yugoslavia. We can only refer to an interesting account of the aspect of cultural hegemony analysed by Lev Centrih (2003). For an analysis of the ideological domination of the technocracy, see the authors of SFRY (1985). The ideological domination of technocracy over bureaucracy and the complex dynamic of different instances expose the problematical claim of mainstream theories of totalitarianism that try to portray bureaucracy as a new class. This new class supposedly determined economical, political and ideological domain. Thinking class without class struggle is impossible. One of first advocates of this type of reasoning was Milovan Đilas, a former hard-liner of the Communist leadership (1962).

between the communist Party and the masses (mass politics and workers' control), the mature period of self-management saw the rise of a professional political and economical class.

The official ideology proclaimed the *integration of capital and labour under the control of the workers*. However, the analysis of the authors of SFRY claims correctly that it is the other way around. There was a basic disintegration, which is “irreconcilable contradiction that is embodied in the workers' class and working people on the one hand, and technocracy and bureaucracy on the other hand” (1985: 66). The workers were supposed to perform the same tasks as the capitalists, but how were the workers going to prepare the regulation and planning of the production process? The workers found themselves in a paradoxical position: instead of struggle against wage labour and capital, they should hold the structural place of the capitalist. The worker is in a schizophrenic position and fights, like Don Quixote did, against himself, whilst the windmills keep on milling. Even if the worker assumes the position of the capitalist, this does not entail that the capital is abolished. Only the social relation changes and with it a new form of exploitation emerges. In the best case the new form of exploitation is a form of self-exploitation in which workers exploit themselves. They remain bound to wage labour despite their domination over capital.<sup>47</sup> But when the technocrats dominated the class struggle in enterprises, the technocrats dominated the workers and the relation between labour and capital shifted back.

After the reforms of 1965 workers could influence the level of their wages. Hence, a mechanism of self-valorisation was established. The workers could directly negotiate the levels of their wages within their BOALs, although the majority of workers or trade union organisation did not follow the development of their wages (Vukmanović-Tempo 1982). The reproduction of labour force was formally under the workers' control. But the most important question did not concern the redistribution of surplus value. The latter remained a mere socialist reformist strategy; the extraction

47 In the capitalist model in Argentina after the crisis, the development of self-management was introduced from below. Given the brutal circumstances, this meant a huge political rupture. See Vieta (2008).

of surplus value continued. The BOALs' profits (at that time called 'extra income') were re-invested in political institutions to promote other economic and non-economic activities, but also invested to reproduce independent capital (the BOALs themselves). The discrepancy between labour and capital remained the principle contradiction according to the authors of SFRY: "socialist self-management is a form of control and management of capital after labour" (ibid: 48). Let us upgrade their conclusion with our thesis on the separation within self-management socialism. *The dominant separations were the ones between production units (market) and within production units (managing or non-managing the production process)*. The typical capitalist separation between the means of production and workers was displaced. The historical advent of the new faction (technocracy) is concurrent with the rise of the managerial fraction in post-Fordism. The key separation in self-management socialism is crucial in understanding the novelties of post-Fordist regime.

## Political Class Struggle

These conclusions open up an interesting political perspective on the history of the struggles. 1950s saw a consolidation of the self-management system; reproductive mechanism of socialist power were set in, or in terms of Rancière, the police worked to suspend revolutionary sequence of politics.<sup>48</sup> Despite the direction toward the eroding of the state, numerous functions and institutions accumulated and became specialised. The more the socialist power tried to disperse the power, the more their effects were felt across society, where a true micro-physics of power was at work. How did this socialist counting take place? Who was the *part-sans-part*, who was excluded from the counting? Who was not heard or seen? Nowadays a dominant 'dissident'<sup>49</sup> answer

48 We borrow some concepts from Rancière's excellent book *Disagreement* (1998).

49 In Slovenia, and in the post-socialist context in general, a dissident position is considered the most pure and authentic position to fight socialism. The most typical representative of this cultural circle in the 1980s gathered around the journal *Nova Revija* [New Review].

reconstructs a *part-sans-part* in a specific way. Dissidents claim that socialism excluded the genius, artist, intellectual or someone who did not fit into the grey landscape of mediocrity, of averages, of equal and uniformed individuals. The terror of equality was enforced upon these individuals who stood like lighthouses in a cruel society. The reality in Yugoslavia could not be more distant from the one painted by dissident intellectuals. Not only were intellectuals well-respected, they were even feared by the communist regime. Their activities had political effects.<sup>50</sup>

A Rancièrian answer could be: Kosovo Albanians or Roma as second-class citizens of Yugoslavia were the ones that were not heard or recognised. This holds water to a certain extent, because these people were indeed excluded from many political institutions. But along the lines of our analysis we will try to pinpoint another exclusion that is linked to the exploitation. A tacit presupposition of Rancièr's theory equates non-visible/non-heard with a passive element, running in accordance with the order of the police, whereas the active force is precisely the one that breaks with the police, with its logic of counting, which makes some invisible and unheard. But even those who take up an active position in society are sometimes not counted. Precisely through their activation they can become passive. Non-visibility cannot be linked only to a role of victim or exclusion, but also to exploitation, which is not necessarily silent, not heard, or non-represented. It can be even presented as a very active part of society. In the Yugoslavian self-management model the politico-aesthetical lenses need to be sharpened: it was precisely the workers, the ones who were supposed to be most included in the order, who were absent from many aspects of decision-making. The formal logic of counting included them in

50 My thesis is in line with Žižek's (2001b): the socialist regime was 'enlightened' in that it believed in the power of ideas. Thus, to refute new artistic movements or theoretical readings of Marx, it did not suffice to censor them. Frequently, critics wrote treatises to fight against the 'incorrect' or 'decadent' deviations in art, theory and science.

the political processes, but they were economically exploited. And this is a pre-eminently political question, which is difficult to expose in a Rancièrian position. The most blatant case of political and economic exclusion could be situated with the youngsters and the unemployed. Although communist leadership was aware of the problem (as we will see in concluding section), it still nourished the myth of full employment in Yugoslavia. It was only through collective struggles by students and workers (1970s and 1980s) that self-management politics emerged. The ones that were not counted made themselves heard and seen in mass strikes and occupation of universities. The following table provides reader with a clearer historical overview of the Yugoslav class struggles.

## 7. The Analysis of Post-Fordism in 'Mature' Self-Management

In the last part of this analysis, we will try to pinpoint some comparisons of Yugoslavian self-management with a post-Fordist tendency within capitalist social formation. The analysis of the authors of SFRY basically shows that a crisis triggered two processes: firstly, a class compromise between the technocrats and the state bureaucracy and secondly, political decisions that produced a new regulation mode of capital within socialism. The synthesis of plan and market caused a new equilibrium. The constant struggle of the ruling class engendered the over-politicisation and *self-managementisation* of the society. Reforms produced the opposite of what party functionaries wanted: rather than enthusiastic workers, expert technocrats ruled in the economy and professional functionaries in politics. This omnipresence of political participation is very similar to the post-Fordist introduction of the politics of communication, participation and cooperation. The major shift in the post-Fordist type of organisation, according to Virno (2004), can be detected in the imperative of participation and the introduction of speech. Arendt claimed that the factory had become a model of politics, whereas Virno claims the exact opposite: work itself has taken over the traditional connotation of political engagement/action. Has political action turned into

Historical period	Agents	Place of struggle	Problems
1941-45 Revolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partisans (masses)</li> <li>• Communist Party</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revolutionary war</li> <li>• Encounter of masses and Communist Party</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Break-up with old Yugoslavia</li> <li>• National Liberation Struggle</li> <li>• Socialist revolution</li> </ul>
45-52 State socialism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bureaucracy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International stage: anti-Stalinism</li> <li>• State: social capital vs. autonomous capitals –</li> <li>• Autarchy: planned economy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nationalisation</li> <li>• Collectivisation</li> <li>• Expropriation *self-management</li> </ul>
'54-'63 Workers' self-management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bureaucracy (BC) VS. Technocracy (TC) (constitution of ruling class)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Foundations for development, federation against republics</li> <li>• International stage: non-aligned movement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First serious crisis Constitution</li> <li>• Opening up to the West</li> </ul>
'65-'73 Market socialism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BC, TC, student revolt (ruling fraction vs. revolutionary politics from below)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Universities</li> <li>• Banks VS Central Bank Federation VS Republics</li> <li>• Regulation: increase of debts</li> <li>• No equilibrium production and consumption</li> <li>• Unemployment</li> <li>• Directed education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management over investments, circulation of money, credits, taxes</li> <li>• Effects of global crisis: unemployment, inflation, debt,</li> <li>• Nationalisms</li> </ul>
Agreement socialism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New social movements, art, theory, civil society, workers (trade unions)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fund for Development</li> <li>• Factories</li> <li>• Regulation: IMF, rationalisation, savings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General crisis: state of exception (army, status of regions); crisis of socialist state; democratisation</li> </ul>
After '80			
Alternative Neoliberalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TC and national BC against federal BC</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intensification and translation of social conflict into national conflicts; break-up</li> </ul>

Table of political processes:  
historical periodisation from Likić-Brborić (2003: 88)

a poor experience of communicating in the working space?<sup>51</sup> One of Virno's weaknesses consists in his non-distinction of 'real' politics from (*self*)*managerialisation* of production relations. What used to be the sphere of the private, bourgeois civil society was transformed into an overtly public and political sphere in socialism. The ideal figure of this suturing of private and public was the self-managed worker, who is structurally holding the same place as the flexible personality of post-Fordism (Holmes 2002). Surely, the cognitive worker's flexible personality is under the complete domination of the capital and thus not much remains of real politics. This means that even if work assumes a public character it does not make it political, as Virno seems to suggest.

The politisation of the production relation does not need to follow from the workers' demands, but quite on the contrary can be in perfect consonance with the capital. Managerial innovations in the West were preceded by official politics of Yugoslav self-management. Workers were asked to help improve their working conditions, negotiate their wages and participate in the production processes. If the cooperation was structurally inscribed in the model of self-management, can we claim the same what concerns speech? One could object that the role of speech has not been of key significance for the development of the Yugoslav economy. Nevertheless, there were many new professions and the cognitivisation of certain branches was already at work in the 1960s. Admittedly, this happened on a much smaller scale than in the West, but was present nevertheless in some successful enterprises that exported products.

Post-Fordism was established as an answer to the failing of the Fordist model of organisation and the revolts of May '68. As was already emphasised, self-management as an event appeared in a radically different historical situation than post-Fordism did. 'Mature' self-management was closely linked with socialist economies in the East, but also in the West. After the relative economic stability and prosperity of the 1950s

51 For a detailed analysis of Virno's theses, see Ciril Oberstar's text in this book.

and the beginning of the 1960s (market elements, motorways, tourism), cyclical major crises in the 1960s and 1970s exposed the vulnerability of the Yugoslav economy to external movements (oil crisis, crisis of the Welfare model), but more importantly to its internal contradictions. *The crisis of the Yugoslavian self-management model was a crisis of the productionist model*. Both socialist economic theories and economic practices focused on the “productionist paradigm”. School Marxisms and more critical economic theories (Horvat, Korošić) operated within a classical Keynesian framework that promoted typical Fordist requirements: full employment, economic growth, and the balance of growing production and consumption. Through Yugoslav’s cyclical crises, manifested in high inflation, accumulation of debts, and especially unemployment,<sup>52</sup> it became clear that bureaucratic planning of the economy was not the sole reason for the crisis. Yugoslavia experienced globalisation trends and responded to the crisis of Fordism. The goals that were accomplished in the mid-1960s – full employment, rise of wages/incomes and production – were rapidly undermined.<sup>53</sup> Močnik lucidly interprets the general situation of the Yugoslav socialist state:

52 The phenomenon of *Gastarbeiter* emerged in the late 1960s, when Willy Brandt and Tito signed a treaty, and reached its peak in the 1980s. About 1 million Yugoslav workers left their home country and the same number of people was unemployed. For figures and a discussion of the major problems of the Yugoslav economy, see Branko Horvat (1985) and Woodward (1995b). One of the central films of the Yugoslav Black Wave, *Kad budem mrtav i beo* [When I am Dead and Pale], meticulously portrays the development of the post-Fordist tendency within Yugoslav society. A range of new freelance professions emerged: musicians, cultural workers of all kinds, journalists.

53 From the 1960s on workers’ strikes occurred in Yugoslavia. The causes for the strikes were various: decreasing wages, products that were no longer accessible as before and the decrease in production in general. See Horvat (1985) or Korošić (1988). These movements intensified when the Yugoslav leadership adopted IMF measures in the beginning of the 1980s. This implied a liberalisation and rationalisation of the economic practices. In reality it meant a shortage of some basic goods and power cuts; the black market flourished.

The reform of 1966 consisted in the introduction of Yugoslavia to the world market. It seems that Kardelj's concept of free exchange of associated labour was actually an attempt of postfordist alternative in the condition of socialist state and solidarity, that is, equality as a cornerstone of official ideology and not as a neoliberal alternative to fordist capitalism that stepped into crisis. I am pretty much sure that socialist states were social states on the periphery in conditions of relative poverty. They performed the same function as a social-democratic state with more prosperity, which were located in the centre of capitalist system. (2008)

Despite the possibility of participation of the workers in the production units (BOALs) and a new answer to the crisis that was formulated as 'market and plan', the Yugoslavian self-management model could find no successful answer to the economic crisis. The post-Fordist answer was not fully realised,<sup>54</sup> moreover it facilitated the reproduction of capitalist relations. One of the major events that triggered many 'regressive' effects was that the labour force market became more flexible. What used to be a guarantee of a relatively prosperous life in the socialist state (stable employment and housing), became less regulated and less secure. With the rise of unemployment (up to 20% in some regions), the unemployed were forced to seek work in semi-legal or illegal sectors; there was a rise of personal dependence (return of previous mode of production), internal migration (from rural to urban areas) and external migration (*Gastarbeiter*).

54 The Yugoslav self-management system could have been a natural answer to the crisis, since it was quite adaptable through institutional and horizontal communication, but its political process was time-consuming. The most fascinating case of a successful post-Fordist answer is to be found in urban self-management. In the recent study on new Zagreb, Eve Blau (2007) shows how the planning of new housing communities in Zagreb integrated socialist modernist concepts with post-Fordist management that became more pragmatically upgraded. It found new ways in integrating different self-management interests, where local inhabitants were usually quite active agents.

Due to the economic crisis and in the light of the new post-Fordist regulation mode, the ruling class launched another important systemic solution, which touched the sphere of knowledge. In the beginning of the 1970s, the educational reform called “directed education” was enforced in Yugoslavia. This reform can be interpreted as an answer to two ‘events’: huge student uprising in the university centres of Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana and in other cities and the general crisis of the Yugoslav economy. Major emphasis was put on knowledge: knowledge was fundamental for the further development of socialism. The reform was basically designed to produce a defined number of cadres that would be more easily introduced in the economy. It had to start fighting growing unemployment and facilitate the entrance of youth to the labour market. Yugoslavia’s “directed education” reform was Bologna’s reform *avant la lettre*.<sup>55</sup> It was a managerial-bureaucratic synthesis, which wanted to make the economy and the labour market function more effectively. Also, via new educational programmes on high schools and prospect involvement in universities, the ideological hegemony of the technocracy (managerial fraction) was instituted. Knowledge became immensely important to innovate self-management production and for political hegemony of the fraction. The reform intended to make the economy more efficient and facilitate the smooth entering into the market of labour forces and opened educational institutions to industrial interest and capitalist cooptation.

## 8. Conclusion

This article serves as an outline for further analysis that intends to tackle a very complex issue: the development of different tendencies in the Yugoslav self-management model that was preceded by a revolutionary politics. We situated revolutionary

55 For a more detailed account of the reform, see Samary (1988). For the analysis of late period of self-management, see Geoffroy (2006). The reform focused more on the secondary school system and the system of examination than on university system.

politics in the period during and after World War II. The political event meant a definite rupture with the existing order of old Yugoslavia. Antifascist partisan struggle entailed a radical transformative moment, which brought a *socialist revolution*. In this respect Yugoslav resistance differs from the resistance struggles across Europe. The Yugoslav partisan struggle was thus not only national liberation but also social transformation, which had strong consequences that materialised in the establishment of a socialist self-management state and non-aligned movement later on. In the following part of our analysis, we pinpointed certain aspects of the internal failure of this project. We proceeded from an Althusserian perspective to analyse all instances: politics (from socialist revolution to self-management politicisation), ideology (humanism of figure of self-manager; economism), law (influence of contractualism) and economy (major contradiction: capital and labour).

The self-management project did not fail due to the inefficiency and inadaptability of its economy. It would further be erroneous to claim that the death of Yugoslavia is connected to the death of Tito. Presumably, this death acted as a sobering up: after a long intoxicated night of prosperity and peace, Yugoslavia needed to repay its immense debts, which put an end to brotherhood and unity. Let us not forget that the external debt of Yugoslavia in the 1980s was not any higher than the debt of other developing and even developed countries. If Yugoslavia had insisted on politics of non-aligned movement and a different model of just economic trade, it could all have been different. Our analysis focused on two moments, which started with the real restoration of the capitalist relation and already announced the death of socialist Yugoslavia. The market reform in 1965 and reform of directed education in 1975 were paving the way towards neo-liberalism.

The project failed because it was not communist enough: it did not continue revolutionary politics in all fields of society. As the authors of SFRY showed, workers did not gain control over the means of production, also commodity relations insistently dominated the economy. We sharpened their analysis of capitalist relations in socialism with the detection of the post-Fordist tendency. The post-Fordist tendency was contained in major

innovations within the economy (new forms of self-exploitation, cooperation), the humanist figure of the flexible self-managed worker and an important stress on knowledge (new regulation mode via reforms). New forms of exploitation, most notably self-exploitation, emerged in this new system. Both economic forms of organisation, Fordist and productivist, succumbed to the major crisis of the late 1960s.

The official answers to the crisis of the self-management model fell short. The bureaucratic answer signalled an insistence on the planning of the national economy in an increasingly globalised world that does not allow for any alternative strategy. This reasoning was stuck in the productivist ideology and consolidation of political power. We could characterise this answer as a reformatory *socialist answer*. The technocrats articulated the second answer, which tried to deal with the capitalist tendency within socialism: opening up to the West, developing tourism, building motorways, introducing modes of knowledge production, participation and efficiency within the production process. This could be called a *post-Fordist answer*. During the major crises in the 1970s both fractions of the ruling class provided a specific synthesis of their responses, which hit hard working people of Yugoslavia.

It was only in the 1980s that the new social movements and the massive workers' strikes (occupations of factories) emerged. But the encounter of these two subjectivities and remaining communists in the Party never happened. In these explosive times of new political forms and subjectivities, in the conjuncture of anti-systemic movements in the anti-systemic state (see Močnik 2000 and Pribac 2003), when the self-management model began to be practiced from below, the social revolution and socialist project were abandoned. The conflicts were translated into nationalistic discourse (cultural and intellectual elites, dissidents) and political questions of insufficient legality of the state (liberal-democratic answer).<sup>56</sup> The media and cultural intelligentsia played an important role in

<sup>56</sup> For a detailed analysis of liberal-nationalist hegemony in Yugoslavia, see Karamanić (2006).

the launch of cultural nationalisation. It was a specific encounter of the technocracy, parts of reformed communist elites and nationalist currents, which produced a counterrevolutionary fusion and announced a precise break with the socialist past. In the times of neoliberal restructuring this counterrevolutionary fusion and new political coalition created conditions for the bloody break-up of Yugoslavian self-management socialism. Thanks to this counterrevolution the people of Yugoslavia completed the transition to capitalism, sometimes more, sometimes less democratically. After the end of Yugoslavia, the only path leads to the family of Europe, to the multicultural logic of plural identities and religions. The same political class tries to convince the Yugoslav people to forget the wars and forget everything connected to the emancipatory moments of Yugoslavia. Twenty years after the fall of Berlin Wall and the break-up of Yugoslavia, when the transition is almost over, we should accept to live peacefully and to be dominated and exploited on the fast trains to Europe. What would the partisans think about this train?

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